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THE OTHER DIGITAL DIVIDE: DISPARITY IN
THE AUCTION OF WIRELESS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS+
Leonard M. Baynes"+ and C. Anthony Bush...
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past several years, the Commerce Department has published
an annual survey entitled Falling Through the Net, which highlights the
disparity between people of color and whites in access to computers and
the Internet.' This disparity is known as the "Digital Divide."' This
Article shows that another Digital Divide exists: members of minority
groups who have participated in the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) auction of spectrum for wireless licenses have, on
average, received fewer opportunities for spectrum ownership than
members of non-minority groups, even in the advent of race-based
bidding credits. This Article then argues that the divide is significant
enough to justify affirmative action programs.
An equal opportunity to own the wireless spectrum is critical at this
stage of its development because acquisition costs are becoming
* Portions of this Article have been reprinted from Leonard M. Baynes, Life After
Adarand: What Happened to the Metro Broadcasting Diversity Rationale for Affirmative
Action in Telecommunications Ownership?, 33 MICH. J.L. REFORM 87 (1999/2000) and
Leonard M. Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past Discrimination in
Establishing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 979
(2000).
" Leonard M. Baynes, Professor of Law, St. John's University, School of Law, Jamaica,
N.Y. B.S. New York University, J.D.-M.B.A., Columbia University. Both Professor
Baynes and Dr. Bush examined these issues while Professor Baynes was a scholar-in-
residence at the Federal Communications Commission serving on then-Chairman
Kennard's Opportunity Team. Professor Baynes would like to thank his research
assistants, Ben Darvil and John DiBari, for their able assistance with this project.
- Dr. C. Anthony Bush, Chief Economist, Office of General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. B.A., Claremont Men's College, M.A.,
M. Phil., Ph. D., Columbia University. The views reflected in this Article are the views
solely of Professor Baynes and Dr. Bush and are not necessarily the views of the Federal
Communications Commission.
1. See Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Americans in the
Information Age Falling Through the Net, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digital
divide (last visited Sept. 26, 2002) (indexing the reports).
2. Id. But see Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Nation
Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet (2002), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) (noting that computer and
Internet access at schools and libraries has narrowed the digital divide).
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prohibitive. The 1990s saw explosive growth in wireless communications,
rising to 14.3 percent of the industry's 1997 revenues This boost was
due to the steadily increasing subscribership for these services.' The
wireless national penetration rate, as of June 1999, was nearly twenty-six
percent of the population. As of 2001, approximately 110 million
Americans had wireless telephones.6 It is expected that this segment of
the telecommunications industry will continue to grow, especially with
the advent of "always on" connections to the Internet.7 In fact, with the
introduction of certain rate plans, the industry is starting to see
customers use wireless telecommunications as a substitute for - rather
than a complement to - plain, old-fashioned wireline telephone service.8
On August 10, 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to grant spectrum
licenses, including those for wireless telephone service, through a
competitive bidding process.9 Competitive bidding is expected to place
3. In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Fourth Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10,145, 10,149 (June 24, 1999)
[hereinafter Fourth Report]; see also Cellular Telecomm. & Internet Association, CTIA's
Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey Results: June 1985-June 2002, at http://www.wow-
com.com/pdf/june2002release.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2002) (finding estimated
subscribers grew 13.7% per year from 1985 to 2002 and total six-month revenues rose to
22.6% per year in the same period). See generally Gordon Caplan, When Standards Don't
Match, Companies Pay, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1998, at B10 ("From 1994 to 1997, the
Federal Communications Commission auctioned over $12 billion worth of spectrum
licenses, the great majority of which were geared toward companies proposing to offer
PCS, primarily digital telephony services.").
4. Fourth Report, supra note 3, at 10,149.
5. Id. at 10,145.
6. MICHAEL CALABRESE, BATTLE OVER THE AIRWAVES, PRINCIPLES FOR
SPECTRUM POLICY REFORM 2 (Oct. 2001).
7. Id.
8. See Fourth Report, supra note 3, at 10,155-56. The widespread adoption of
AT&T's "digital-one-rate" price plan has caused some of the most dramatic growth in this
segment of the telecommunications industry. Id. at 10,155. The plans generally consist of
bundles of large quantities of minutes for a fixed monthly rate with a low per-minute price
- and sometimes no roaming charges. Id.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2000). Prior to the Act, the FCC granted licenses by
comparative hearings or lotteries. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, The FCC Report to
Congress on Spectrum Auctions, 13 F.C.C.R. 960.1, 9608-09 (Oct. 9, 1997). The
comparative hearing was an administrative hearing in which the FCC would determine, on
a qualitative basis, whether a broadcast applicant would serve the "public interest,
convenience and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988). Some of the factors weighed by
the FCC were (1) diversification of control; (2) full-time participation in station operation
by owners; (3) proposed program service; (4) past service record; (5) efficient use of
frequency; (6) character; (7) financial capability; and (8) minority ownership.
Comparative hearings were slow; they caused a great deal of delay, and they were
expensive. FCC Report to Congress, supra, at 9608-09. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
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billions of dollars in the federal treasury.0 As a method of distributing
licenses, competitive bidding has generally been favored over the
previous methods of distribution because it is efficient and contributes to
the reduction of the federal budget deficit." While many consider
competitive bidding to be a vast improvement over previous FCC
distribution methods, others consider competitive bidding manifestly
unfair because it creates an uneven playing field on which the person
with the most money wins even though he or she is not necessarily the
"most worthy."12
ultimately found the comparative hearings to be arbitrary and capricious. In Bechtel v.
FCC, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the entire ownership integration credit criteria including
race and gender considerations. 10 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court specifically
stated that the "integration preference is peculiarly without foundation." Id. at 887. In
1994, the FCC stayed all ongoing comparative hearing cases pending resolution of the
issues raised in Bechtel. Against this backdrop, as part of the 1993 Budget Act, Congress
added section 3090) of the Communications Act expressly to require that the FCC use
competitive bidding procedures to resolve most initial licensing proceedings involving
mutually exclusive applications for commercial broadcast licenses. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)
(2000). In addition, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated comparative hearings
for renewals of incumbent licensees. 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (2000) (specifically providing that
the FCC "shall not consider whether public interest, convenience, and necessity might be
served by the grant of a license to a person other than the renewal applicant").
Prior to the enactment of section 309(j), Congress authorized the FCC to award licenses
by lottery. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (2000). Lotteries allowed the FCC to handle large volumes
of applications much more quickly and shielded the FCC from allegations of improperly
granting licenses on political or other grounds. It was thought that lotteries were an
unsatisfactory method of awarding the licenses because of the manner in which the FCC
arbitrarily exercised its public interest mandate. In addition, lotteries allowed for
speculators with no intent to build a network to acquire licenses through lotteries and to
turn around and sell the licenses to the highest bidders. FCC Report to Congress, supra, at
9609.
10. FCC Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, News Release, FCC Hits $20 Billion
Mark in Total Auction Revenues (1996), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/
NewsReleases/1996/nrw16015.txt (noting that since 1996, six FCC auctions raised $20
billion in total auction revenues). In fact, the three-month auction of ninety-nine PCS
licenses ending on March 13, 1995 raised more than $7.7 billion and was recognized by the
Guiness Book of World Records as raising the most revenue in history. See FCC Wireless
Communications Bureau, News Release, FCC Grants 99 Licenses For Broadband
Personal Communications Services in Major Trading Areas (1996), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/NewsReleases/1995/nrw5009.txt.
11. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How
Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. 761, 763
(1996) (stating that "bidding preferences increased the government's revenue by more
than 12 percent - an increase in total revenues of nearly $ 45 million").
12. See JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 129 n.3 (2001); Kurt
Wimmer & Lee Tiedrich, Competitive Bidding and Personal Communications Services: A
New Paradign for FCC Licensing, 3 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 17 (1994); American
Telecoms. Spectrum Rush, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1998, at 63 (noting "monopolists are
2003]
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The FCC awards licenses for use of the public spectrum, which is
owned by the American people. The FCC provides the licensees with
the right to use the spectrum for a period of time. Once the licenses are
awarded, the license holders are fiduciaries in public trust of the
spectrum." As a result of these public interest obligations, any
distribution procedure must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that it is
fair and that many have a chance to participate.
Congress recognized that fairness was an integral part of the
competitive bidding procedures. In the Communications Act, Congress
required the FCC to "ensure that ... businesses owned by members of
minority groups . . . are given the opportunity to participate in the
provision of spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes, consider
the use of tax certificates, bidding [credits], and other procedures.' 4 The
FCC originally proposed that an aggregate bidding credit of twenty-five
percent 5 be given to minority-owned 6 that participated in the
C and F block auctions. Under this plan, if a minority-owned business
always likely to be able to bid more than a new entrant in order to maintain their
monopoly").
13. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) (2000).
15. These firms would have received a ten percent bidding credit for being small and
a fifteen percent bidding credit for being minority owned.
16. Minority-owned businesses were eligible for these credits under two options.
Under the first option, the gross revenues and total assets of certain investors were not to
be counted toward the financial caps of gross revenues of $125 million in each of the last
two years and total assets of less than $500 million, so long as the applicant had a control
group consisting of one or more designated entities or individuals that: (1) controlled the
applicant; (2) held at least 25% of the equity; and (3) for corporations, held at least 50.1%
of the voting stock. Under the second option, minority-owned firms were able to sell up to
49.9% of their equity to a single investor including 25% of the voting rights, without the
gross revenues and total assets of such investor being attributable to the minority-owned
applicant, so long as the control group: (1) controlled the applicant; (2) held 50.1% of the
equity; and (3) in the case of corporate applicants, held at least 50.1 % of the voting stock.
17. The FCC has had several programs in place to try to increase ownership of
broadcast and other spectrum by women and minorities. These affirmative action
programs were often justified on the grounds that, at least in the broadcast area, people of
color and women were more likely to offer different programming than stations owned by
members of the majority. The Supreme Court agreed with this analysis for affirmative
action programs in telecommunications ownership in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990). In Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme Court, under an
intermediate level of scrutiny, found constitutional two FCC affirmative programs: (1) the
distress sale policy, which created a market only of minorities for a station that was in
jeopardy of losing its license; and (2) additional consideration for minority-owned
businesses, which gave prospective licensees a "plus" during the comparative hearings
proceedings. See id. at 552. The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena brought into question the constitutionality of these programs when the Supreme
Court held that all government affirmative action programs would be analyzed under the
[Vol. 52:351
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bid $1.25 million for a license and a majority-owned business bid $1.24
million for the same license, the FCC would award the minority-owned
business the license, although the FCC would only receive $1 million for
the license."' In addition, the FCC planned to propose additional
benefits including reduced up-front payments and installment payments
for acquiring the license.'9
The FCC, however, eliminated all race-based considerations in
awarding wireless licenses after the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2° which held that all race-based
government programs were subject to strict scrutiny." To survive strict
scrutiny, government programs must serve a compelling state interest
and offer a narrowly tailored remedy.22 The FCC decided to eliminate all
race-based considerations because it lacked a record establishing a
compelling governmental interest.21 In addition, the FCC's decision was
predicated on a political climate adverse to affirmative action programs.
In the absence of race-based programs, the FCC's reliance on a
competitive bidding process to distribute wireless licenses raises the issue
of whether it can achieve its public interest mandate of ensuring that
licenses are awarded on a nondiscriminatory basis to members of
minority groups. This Article explores this question by employing the
strict scrutiny test. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The Adarand Court overruled the standard
of review used in Metro Broadcasting, raising the question of whether the FCC's programs
were still good law and bringing additional complexity to this already difficult area of the
law. Id.
18. The $1.25 million bid would be the sum of the 25% credit and the $1 million bid
by the minority-owned business.
19. See generally FCC Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 9631-33. The installment
payment program would allow the licensee to pay for the costs of its license over the
license term. The FCC would assume that bidders able to raise the upfront payments
"were financially sound and able to provide services." Id. at 9631. Some of the C-Block
wireless winners ran into financial difficulty in paying the installment payments. Id. at
9632. As a result, the FCC decided not to offer the installment payment programs in any
subsequent auctions.
20. 515 U.S. 200 (1985); see also FCC Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 9646;
Leonard M. Baynes, Life After Adarand: What Happened to the Metro Broadcasting
Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Telecommunications Ownership?, 33 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 87, 108 (1999/2000); Leonard M. Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes,
Diversity and Past Discrimination in Establishing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast
Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 988-991 (2000).
21. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
22. Id.
23. FCC Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 9646.
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affirmative action tests that the Supreme Court outlined in Adarand and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
2
1
Since the Supreme Court issued the Adarand decision, no department
of the federal government has performed a study to justify affirmative
action programs. The Justice Department, however, has reviewed
numerous studies by state and local governments of discrimination in
procurement." As a result, the Justice Department issued a public notice
entitled Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal
Procurement." These reforms addressed more specifically the second
part of the Adarand test, which deals with narrow tailoring. 7
The Justice Department was of the opinion that it was unnecessary to
focus on the first part of the Adarand test, which requires a compelling
governmental interest, because a wealth of evidence of past
discrimination existed to support affirmative action programs in federal
procurement. 8 The Justice Department specifically stated:
Based upon [a number of] congressional actions, the legislative
history supporting them, and the evidence available to
Congress, this congressional judgment is credible and
constitutionally defensible. Indeed, the survey of currently
available evidence conducted by the Justice Department since
the Adarand decision, including the review of numerous specific
studies of discrimination conducted by state and local
governments throughout the nation, leads to the conclusion
that, in the absence of affirmative remedial efforts, federal
contracting would unquestionably reflect the continuing impact
of discrimination that has persisted over an extended period. For
purposes of these proposed reforms, therefore, the Justice
Department takes as a constitutionally justified premise that
affirmative action in federal procurement is necessary and that
the federal government has a compelling interest to act on that
29basis in the award of federal contracts.
24. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that the City of Richmond's affirmative action
program, which aimed to increase the number of minority contractors, was
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny).
25. See Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed.
Reg. 26,042, 26,042 (May 23, 1996).
26. Id. This proposal was designed to be a model for amending the affirmative action
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 52:351
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Unlike the field of government contracting, FCC wireless licensing
does not have a long history of discrimination or a wealth of information
documenting discrimination against minority licensees. In fact, this
Article is the first to use the analysis of Croson and Adarand in the area
of wireless auctions to determine whether a compelling interest exists. In
Section Two, the authors examine the statutory and regulatory
affirmative action programs at the FCC. Section Three provides a brief
history of affirmative action jurisprudence. In Section Four, the authors
argue that there is discrimination in wireless licensing on two bases: 1)
the nexus between the FCC's actions in distributing licenses by
competitive bidding and capital market discrimination, and 2) the
disparity in utilization ratios between minority and non-minority
applicants for each of the auctions. The authors believe, however, that
the specific requirements of a utilization ratio create additional
complexity and problems in performing the calculations in this industry.
Finally, this Article concludes that there is capital market discrimination
against minority-owned telecommunications businesses and that these
minority-owned businesses are constitutionally underutilized, which
presents a compelling governmental interest for establishing affirmative
action programs in wireless competitive bidding.
II. FCC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
The FCC has justified previous affirmative action programs on the
basis of encouraging present and future diversity - "viewpoint diversity
in the case of broadcast and ownership diversity in the case of spectrum-
based services."30 The programs for spectrum-based services have only
recently pointed to past discrimination against minorities as their
justification.3  Most of these programs have been eliminated by
congressional action, judicial review, or FCC action.32
Section 309(j) of the Communications Act allows the FCC to select
licensees by competitive bidding.33 Section 309(j)(3)(B) instructs the
30. Baynes, Life After Adarand, supra note 20, at 91.
31. See generally S. REP. No. 99-1,91, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2237, 2284-89 (detailing the
legislative history of § 309(i) dealing with distribution of licenses by lottery and noting past
discrimination against minority entrepreneurs); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-10;
Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-80.
32. See Baynes, Life After Adarand, supra note 20, at 91. "The only programs that
still are technically in effect are the distress sale policy and the leased access minority
programming rule. ... Id. Post-Adarand, the constitutionality of these programs is
uncertain, and they are not currently being used by the FCC. Id.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2000). The history of Congress's approval of licensing by
lottery is also relevant to FCC affirmative action. In 1981, Congress enacted section 309(i)
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FCC to establish competitive bidding procedures that "promot[e]
economic opportunity and competition and ensur[e] that new and
innovative technologies are readily accessible to the American people ...
by disseminating licenses among ...businesses owned by members of
minority groups and women. ' 3 4  Again in section 309(j)(4)(C)(ii),
Congress requires the FCC, in prescribing area designations and
bandwidth assignments, to promote "economic opportunity for a wide
variety of applicants, including small businesses ... and businesses owned
by members of minority groups and women."35  In creating these
opportunities, section 309(j)(4)(D) suggests that the FCC consider using
"tax certificates, bidding preferences, and other procedures."
36'
While considering these provisions, the House Subcommittee on
Minority Enterprise, Finance, and Urban Development held hearings
and heard testimony from several experts concerning the historical
of the Communications Act to allow the FCC to select licensees by lottery. 47 U.S.C. §
309(i) (2000). Section 309(i) also required the FCC to establish incentives, rules, and
procedures ensuring "significant preferences" for minority-controlled applicants in
awarding licenses by lottery. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (2000); see also Random Selection
Procedures for Mass Media Services, Preferences, 47 C.F.R. § 1.1622 (2001). The FCC
used this section to award wireless licenses for cellular, specialized mobile radio, and low-
power TV. As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress limited
the use of random selections to "applications accepted for filing" by the FCC before July
26, 1993, and section 309(i) required an FCC determination that the use of the
communications spectrum is not to be distributed by auction. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(5)(B)
(2000). In 1997, Congress enacted legislation that caused section 309(i) to expire on July 1,
1997 except for the award of licenses and permits for public, noncommercial television
stations. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002(a)(2)(B), 111 Stat.
251, 260 (1997).
The legislative history of section 309(i), however, evidences Congress's awareness of
the discrimination that affects minority entrepreneurs in the communications industry.
See S. REP. NO. 97-191, at 40-46 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2237, 2284-90. In
addition to relying on the diversity rational, Congress specifically noted that "the effects of
past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe
underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass communications, as it has
adversely affected their participation in other sectors of the economy as well." Id. at 43,
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2287. But see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-765, at 23 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2267 (indicating that Congress's intent in implementing section
309(i)(3)(A) was to foster diversity). Congress concluded that adding race-based
preferences to random selection procedures would remedy "the past economic
disadvantage to minorities which has limited their entry into various sectors of the
economy, including the media of mass communications." S. REP. No. 97-191, at 44 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2237, 2288. Congress also observed that the preferences
created in section 309(i) were "narrowly-drawn" to promote diversity in mass
communications. Id.
34. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B)(2000) (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 309(j)(4)(C)(ii)(2000) (emphasis added).
36. Id. § 309()(4)(D)(2000).
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exclusion that minorities have faced in trying to enter the
telecommunications industry.37 The House of Representatives also
acknowledged that bidding credits were not necessarily connected to
diversity of viewpoints:
[U]nlike mass media licenses, where diversity in ownership
contributes to diversity of viewpoints, most of the licenses
issued pursuant to the bidding authority contained in section
3090) will be for services where the race or gender of the
licensee will not affect the delivery of service to the public.
Nevertheless, the Commission should adopt regulations
pursuant to this section to ensure that businesses owned by
members of minority groups and women are not in any way
excluded from the competitive bidding process.38
In 1994, in implementing section 3090) of the Communications Act,
the FCC promulgated rules39 that gave a twenty-five percent "bidding
credit" to businesses owned by minorities and women who partook in
auctions.40 The bidding credits involved in the auctions were challenged
in two cases. In Graceba Total Communications, Inc. v. FCC,4' a non-
minority complainant won two licenses to provide interactive video data
services but argued that the bidding credits given to members of minority
groups and women artificially inflated auction prices and resulted in
discrimination against the complainant; thus, he demanded a twenty-five
percent reduction in the price of his licenses.42 While complainant's
petition was still pending before the FCC, the Supreme Court decided
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,4' holding that federal affirmative
action programs are unconstitutional unless "they are narrowly tailored
37. See H. REP. No. 103-885, at 237-38 (1995).
38. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 255 (1993).
39. For the entrepreneur's block of the PCS auction, the following benefits existed:
(1) a woman or minority-owned applicant could have a single passive non-voting investor
with an interest as large as 49.9% if the applicant held 50.1% interest; (2) a special
exception allowed for an individual member of the control group of a minority-owned C-
block applicant even though the individual's other business properties would otherwise
make the applicant too large for the entrepreneur's block; and (3) minority and women-
owned businesses were to receive an additional fifteen percent bidding credit, tax
certificates, and more favorable installment payment plans than other businesses. Fifth
Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, 91 130-47 (1994).
40. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act - Competitive
Bidding, Fourth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2330, 2336-39 (1994); Competitive Bidding
Procedures, 47 C.F.R. § 95.816(d)(1) (1996).
41. 115 F.3d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
42. Id. at 1039-40.
43. 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Graceba, 115 F.3d at 1039-40.
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measures that further compelling governmental interests. 4 4 In Graceba,
the D.C. Circuit refused to rule on the constitutionality of the program
but remanded the case to the FCC because the expertise of the agency
would be beneficial to resolving many issues.45
These bidding rules were also at issue in Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC.46 A
non-minority licensee challenged the constitutionality of the FCC's
tiered bidding credits and claimed that they violated equal protection.47
Shortly after this challenge was filed, the Supreme Court decided
Adarand,48 and the FCC stayed the auction rule provisions to evaluate
them in light of the decision. 49 The FCC subsequently released its Sixth
Report and Order, which eliminated tiered bidding credits for minorities
and women and provided the same bidding credits and installment
payments to all small businesses. 50 The Circuit Court held that the FCC's
actions in eliminating gender and racial tier-bidding credits were not
arbitrary and capricious."
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcriON
PROGRAMS
The law applicable to affirmative action programs is very complicated
and has varied over the past few years as the Justices on the Supreme
Court have changed. The Court has employed two distinct types of
judicial review of race-based affirmative action programs and has
justified these programs on three distinct grounds: (1) diversity of voices;
(2) diversity designed to correct racial imbalance; and (3) remedy for
past discrimination. Although race-based affirmative action programs
were first analyzed under an intermediate level of scrutiny,52 in Adarand,
the Supreme Court made strict scrutiny the sole standard of review.53
Under that standard of review, remedying past or present discrimination
may be the only compelling governmental interest that justifies
44. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; see also Graceba, 115 F.3d at 1040.
45. Graceba, 115 F.3d at 1041-42.
46. 78 F.3d 620, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996).




51. Id. at 632-33.
52. Baynes, Life After Adarand, supra note 20, at 96.
53. See id.
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affirmative action programs. What follows is a brief history of the
Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence.
A. Diversity of Voices: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC55
In the past, the FCC has been constitutionally permitted to regulate
broadcasters in an effort to foster diversity of viewpoints. The FCC
used this diversity-of-viewpoints rationale as a basis for implementing
programs to extend broadcast ownership opportunities to members of
minority groups and women.57 In deciding this policy, the FCC reasoned
that more diverse ownership, in terms of race and gender, would lead to
58more diverse perspectives. In Metro Broadcasting, however, two FCC
affirmative action rules were challenged as discriminatory to non-
minority applicants. The challenged policies involved: (1) "a program
awarding an enhancement for minority ownership in comparative
proceedings;" and (2) "the minority 'distress sale' program, which
permit[ted] a limited category of existing radio and television broadcast
stations to be transferred only to minority-controlled firms."59
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court used an intermediate level of
scrutiny in analyzing the FCC's affirmative action programs."" The Metro
Broadcasting Court specifically held:
[B]enign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-
even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being
designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they serve important governmental objectives within the
power of the Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."
The Metro Broadcasting Court noted that the FCC policies served no.... 62
remedial objective addressing past discrimination but concluded that
54. See id. (questioning the constitutionality, post-Adarand, of programs intended to
promote diversity of ownership).
55. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
56. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 798-802 (1978)
(sanctioning then-existing FCC rules requiring the divestiture of either a newspaper or
broadcast station where they were owned by the same company in the same community).
57. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 555-56.
58. See id. at 566.
59. Id. at 552. In Metro Broadcasting, plaintiffs challenged only the racial
enhancement portion of comparative hearing policies.
60. Id. at 564-65.
61. Id. (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 566 (noting that the FCC did not justify the regulations on a remedial basis).
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they served the "important governmental objective" of promoting
"programming diversity."63  The Supreme Court determined that
important differences existed between the broadcasting practices of
minority owners and those of their non-minority counterparts.
6
4
According to the Court, the evidence suggested that an owner's minority
status "'appear[ed] to have specific impact on the presentation of
minority images in local news,' inasmuch as minority-owned stations tend
to devote more news time to topics of minority interest and to avoid
racial and ethnic stereotypes in portraying minorities., 65 Thus, the Court
66upheld the FCC's policies. In Adarand, however, the Supreme Court
67overruled the intermediate standard of review used in Metro
Broadcasting and required that the FCC's affirmative action programs
61meet the strict scrutiny standard of review.
B. Diversity Designed To Correct Racial Imbalance: Fullilove v.
Klutznick69
The Public Works Employment Act conditioned federal support for
local public works on a ten percent set-aside for minority-owned
businesses.0  In deciding the constitutionality of the set-aside, the
63. Id.; cf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) (plurality opinion finding that diversity in admissions to schools of higher
education was a compelling interest).
64. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 580.
65. Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 552.
67. The Adarand Court also specifically overruled the intermediate standard of
review used in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. The Court stated that to the extent Metro
Broadcasting was inconsistent with this ruling, it was overruled. The Court reasoned that
Metro Broadcasting departed from prior cases in two respects: one, it turned its back on
Croson's explanation as to why strict scrutiny of all government racial classifications is
essential; and second, Metro Broadcasting rejected congruence between the standards
applicable to federal and state racial classifications. In addition, the Adarand Court stated
that Metro Broadcasting undermined two other constitutional standards - skepticism of all
racial classifications and consistency of treatment irrespective of the race of the burdened
or benefited group.
68. In Adarand, the Supreme Court failed to determine whether diversity is a
compelling governmental interest under the strict scrutiny test. Accordingly, uncertainty
remains as to whether the FCC's broadcast affirmative action programs would be
constitutional under this new test. See Baynes, Life After Adarand, supra note 20, at 91-
97.
69. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
70. Id. at 453-54. The Act authorized a $4 billion appropriation for federal grants to
state and local governments for use in public works projects. Id. at 453. The primary
purpose of the Act was to stimulate the national economy. Id. at 456-57.
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Supreme Court failed to produce a majority opinion." The Chief Justice
noted at the outset that although racial classifications call for "close
examination," the Court owed deference to congressional decisions.
7 2
Chief Justice Burger explained:
We are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference
to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution
with the power to "provide for the ... general Welfare of the
United States" and "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.73
Chief Justice Burger observed that "[a]ny preference based on racial
or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination
to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.,
74
He employed a two-part test, which first asked "whether the objectives of
th[e] legislation are within the power of Congress" and second "whether
the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a
constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional
objectives.""
After employing this test, the Court upheld the program.76  Chief
Justice Burger wrote that Congress "not only may induce voluntary
action to assure compliance with existing federal statutory or
constitutional antidiscrimination provisions, but also, where Congress has
authority to declare certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, authorize
and induce state action to avoid such conduct."77
71. Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion; Justices Marshall and Powell wrote
concurring opinions; Justices Stewart and Stevens wrote dissenting opinions. See id. at
452.
72. Id. at 472 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
73. Id. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 specifically provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this Article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5. The Fourteenth Amendment otherwise provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. § 1.
74. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
75. Id. at 473.
76. Id. at 492.
77. Id. Justice Powell wrote separately to express his view that the plurality opinion
employed "strict judicial scrutiny." See id. at 496 n.1. Justice Stewart dissented, arguing
that the Constitution required the federal government to meet the same strict standard as
the states when enacting racial qualifications and that the program before the Court failed
that standard. See generally id. at 522-32.
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C. Past Discrimination: United States v. Paradise 8
In 1972, a district judge in Alabama found that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety had systematically excluded Blacks as state
troopers and imposed a hiring quota requiring the Department to refrain
from engaging in discrimination in its employment and promotion
practices. 9 After lengthy litigation concerning discrimination in both
hiring and promotion, 8° in 1983 the district court ordered that at least
fifty percent of those promoted must be Black as long as qualified Black
candidates were available."' This quota would last until the Department
implemented an acceptable promotion procedure. A plurality of the
Supreme Court found that there was a compelling governmental
interest"3 for this quota because it was designed to remedy past andpresent discrimination by the Alabama Department of Public Safety. 8
The Adarand Court reserved judgment on whether the program upheld in Fullilove
would survive strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
In Adarand, the Court held that "to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial
classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling." Id.
78. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
79. Id. at 154-55 (plurality opinion). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 156.
80. Id. at 157-62.
81. Id. at 163.
82. Id. at 164.
83. In determining whether the quota was narrowly tailored, the Court evaluated the
following factors: (1) "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies;"
(2) "the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver
provisions;" (3) "the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market;" and
(4) "the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties." Id. at 171. The Court found
that it was necessary to have the quota because Blacks were injured by the Department's
delay in developing an acceptable promotion procedure and "the whites promoted since
1972 'were the specific beneficiaries of an official policy [that] systematically excluded all
blacks."' Id. at 173 (quoting the opinion of the circuit court). The Court found that the
quota was flexible because it could be waived if no qualified Black candidates were
available, it applied only when the Department needed to make promotions, and it
endured only until the Department developed acceptable promotion procedures. Id. at
177-78. The fifty percent quota lasted only until twenty-five percent of a rank was Black.
The Court found that the fifty percent quota was constitutionally permissible because it
addressed the Department's delay in developing nondiscriminatory promotion
procedures. Id. at 179-82. The Court also found that the quota did not impose an
unacceptable burden on third-party white applicants because it was temporary and
"extremely limited," applying only for promotions to corporals and not other upper ranks.
Moreover, the burden imposed was diffuse like a hiring goal. Id. at 182-83.
84. Id. at 167-71. In addition, the plurality found that the remedy was narrowly
tailored. See id. at 171-85. The Court found that the quota was "narrowly tailored to
accomplish its purposes - to remedy past discrimination and eliminate its lingering
effects." Id. at 171.
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D. The Supreme Court Modifies Its Affirmative Action Jurisprudence
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.8 5
The City of Richmond adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan ,86
which required prime contractors who were awarded city construction
contracts "to subcontract at least [thirty percent] of the dollar amount of
the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises."" Using the
strict scrutiny standard,88 the Supreme Court invalidated the city's plan.89
The Croson Court held that there was no compelling governmental
interest 9° because the City of Richmond presented only generalized
assertions of past discrimination.
85. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
86. The plan defined "Minority Business Enterprise" as "[a] business at least fifty-
one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled.., by minority group members." Id. at
478. Minority group members were defined as "[c]itizens of the United States who are
Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id. No geographic
limits restricted the plan; "an otherwise qualified [Minority Business Enterprise] from
anywhere in the United States could avail itself of the 30% set-aside." Id.
87. Id. at 477.
88. See id. at 494. Racial classifications are constitutional under this standard only if
they: (1) further a compelling governmental interest; and (2) are narrowly tailored.
89. Id. at 511.
90. The Croson Court noted that it was almost impossible to assess whether
Richmond's affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored because it was not linked to
identified discrimination. Id. at 507. Nonetheless, the Court observed that Richmond did
not consider race-neutral means and that the thirty percent quota was based on unrealistic
assumptions. Id. at 507-08. The Court noted that the City of Richmond failed to show
that many of the barriers to minority participation, such as lack of capital or failure to
meet bonding requirements, were discriminatory. The Court suggested that a race-neutral
program of city financing for small firms would lead to greater minority participation. Id.
at 507. The Court also criticized the thirty percent quota as overly rigid and unrealistic
because it assumed that minorities would choose a particular trade in "lockstep proportion
to their representation in the local population." Id. In addition, under the plan, no
inquiry was made as to whether the particular minority business receiving the preference
suffered from the effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors. The
Court also noted that "any Black, Hispanic or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere in the
country enjoyed an absolute preference over other citizens based solely on their race." Id.
(emphasis added).
91. Id. at 489-90. The Croson Court distinguished the facts of its case from Fullilove.
Id. at 489-90. In Fultilove, the Court relied on the fact that Congress, "unlike any State or
political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 490. The power to "enforce" may, at times, also include
the power to define situations, which Congress determines threaten principles of equality,
and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations. Id. The Croson Court noted
that just because "Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide
discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are
free to decide that such remedies are appropriate." Id. The Court stated: "To hold
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According to the Court, to establish a compelling governmental
interest, the government needed to make a prima facie showing of prior
92or present discrimination. The discrimination could either be by the
governmental actor or by its passive complicity in the discrimination of
others.93 The Court reasoned that "any public entity, state or federal, has
a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax
contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice." 94 However, the alleged discrimination must be more than a
mere allegation of societal discrimination.95 Finally, the Court noted that
a gross statistical disparity between utilized minority business enterprises
and those available for use may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern
or practice of discrimination. 96
2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena97
In Adarand, the Supreme Court extended the Croson strict scrutiny
standard of review to federal affirmative action programs." Therefore,
all racial classifications-federal, state, or local, malevolent or benign-
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.99 The
Adarand Court sought to find "consistency" and "congruence" between
all standards of review that the Court had previously employed for race-
otherwise [would] cede control . . . to the [fifty] state legislatures .... and insulate any
[state] racial classification from judicial scrutiny .. " Id.
92. See id. at 504.
93. See id. at 492.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 503.
96. Id.
97. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, the petitioner, Adarand Constructors, Inc.,
claimed "that the Federal Government's practice of giving general contractors on
Government projects a financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by 'socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals,' and in particular, the Government's use of
race-based presumptions in identifying such individuals, violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id. at 204.
98. Id. at 235. Four justices - Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens - dissented. Id.
at 242, 264. Two of the dissenting opinions urged deference to Congress in this field. See
id. at 264 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 271 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and
Thomas concurred in the decision but evinced an abhorrence for affirmative action
programs of any kind. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Even in
the case of past discrimination, Justice Scalia would limit a remedy only to those who
could show that they actually suffered discrimination. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
99. See id. at 227 (noting that such classifications are constitutional only if they: (1)
further a compelling governmental interest; and (2) are narrowly tailored).
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based legislation or regulations."" The Court sought "congruence"
because, even if the law was designed with the best intentions, the
Supreme Court was of the opinion that voluntary race-based affirmative
action plans had the tendency to stereotype and stigmatize their
beneficiaries. 1
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor wanted to dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'' 2  Noting that race
discrimination still occurs, she explained: "The unhappy persistence of
both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government
is not disqualified from acting in response to it."' 3  She specifically
stated: "When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling
interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases. ' 4 She
took note of the existence of discrimination, and the constitutionality of
race-based remedies in eliminating it, by citing the Paradise case.105
The Court remanded the Adarand case for further consideration of the
principles that it announced in its opinion.'O° The Adarand district court
noted that the court of appeals failed to decide the question of whether
100. Id. at 223-24.
101. Id. at 226-27.




105. Id. In Paradise, every Justice of the Supreme Court agreed that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory
conduct" justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy. See id. at 237 (citing United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)).
106. Id. at 239. On remand, the district court judge chided the Supreme Court for
remanding the case without giving the lower court more direction. Senior District Court
Judge Kane stated:
The prudence of remanding this case to the trial court is difficult to perceive.
Both parties have stipulated to the absence of any dispute of material fact, ...
and the "unresolved questions" posed by Justice O'Connor ... concern only
issues of statutory construction relating to "the details of the complex regulatory
regimes" and a number of "apparent discrepanc[ies]" the Court found in the
application of the statutes and regulations involved.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1558 (D. Colo. 1997). The district
court judge also noted that "the Tenth Circuit's vacation of its judgment and remand to
the trial court eluded him since there was no genuine issue of material fact." Id. The
district court noted that the decision to require strict scrutiny "alters the playing field in
some important respects." Id. The district court was of the opinion that "the higher
courts are better equipped to decide as a matter of law whether, under the proper
interpretation, the statutes involved can be described as in furtherance of a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest." Id.
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the interests served by the use of subcontractor compensation clauses are
properly described as "compelling."'" 7 The circuit court also failed to
address the issue of narrow tailoring in terms of strict scrutiny review.
'08
IV. ESTABLISHING A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST TO
SUPPORT FCC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
For a race-based, affirmative action program to be upheld, there has to
be a "strong basis in evidence" to support the conclusion that remedial
action is necessary. 0 9 According to the Croson Court, three crucial
elements may establish a compelling governmental interest for an
affirmative action program: (1) showing a government entity was a
"passive participant" in discrimination against members of minority
groups; " (2) showing the underutilization of minority participants in the
relevant market;... and (3) showing anecdotal evidence of the
discrimination. 2 In the remainder of this Section, we will show that the
107. See Adarand, 965 F. Supp. at 1558. The Adarand district court found that
Congress considered a "vast body of evidence" of past discrimination before it enacted the
affirmative action proposals. See id. at 1576. The evidence suggested that by holding
hearings and examining evidence and testimony, Congress regularly reexamined the issue
of disadvantage in federal contracting due to racial discrimination and found that the
disadvantage continued. Id. at 1575. Congress also received various reports from the
Small Business Administration demonstrating a continued need for programs to remedy
the disparities between minorities and non-minorities. Id. In addition, there was evidence
of numerous post-Croson "disparity studies" comparing "actual utilization of minority
owned businesses with availability levels." Id. The studies "show[ed] a serious pattern of
discrimination across all regions." Id.
The district court found that "Congress had a strong basis in evidence from which it
could conclude there were significant discriminatory barriers facing minority business."
Id. at 1576. The court cited some of the most notable aspects of the evidence:
"deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, disabilities
caused by an inadequate 'track record,' lack of awareness of bidding opportunities,
unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection before the formal advertising process,
and the exercise of discretion by government procurement officers to disfavor minority
businesses." Id. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 467). The district court found, on the
record, that "Congress had sufficient evidence, at the time these measures were enacted,
to determine reasonably and intelligently that discriminatory barriers existed in federal
contracting." Id. However, it clearly labeled this finding as dicta. Id. at 1570.
108. See id. at 1558. On remand, the district court found that the government program
was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 1581. The district court noted that the more identifiable
the discriminatory barriers were, the more likely it was that the measures enacted to
eliminate those barriers were narrowly tailored. Id. at 1577.
109. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
110. Id. at 492.
111. LId. at 503.
112. Id. at 479-84.
[Vol. 52:351
Disparity in the Auction of Wireless Telecommunications
first two of these considerations are met in the field of FCC spectrum
licensing.
A. Passive Complicity in the Discrimination of Others
The Croson case distinguished "past discrimination" from "societal
discrimination. ',1 3  According to Croson, past discrimination by the
government, or the government's passive participation in the
discrimination by others, would serve as a compelling government
interest.1 4 The Court reasoned that "any public entity, state or federal,
has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the
tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice.... 5 Evidence of diffuse non-specific societal discrimination
would be an insufficient compelling governmental interest. In Adarand,
Justice O'Connor suggested that the "past discrimination" need not be
caused directly by the government actor. She stated that government is
not disqualified from acting in response to the practice and in addressing
the "lingering effects of racial discrimination.'1
6
The Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have provided some clarity as to
what constitutes passive complicity. 1 7  In Contractors Association of
113. Id. at 497.
114. Id. at 492.
115. Id. Unlike this past discrimination - active or passive - diffuse, non-specific
societal discrimination is an insufficient governmental interest.
116. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
117. In contrast, in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit
erroneously attempted to narrow the notion of "past discrimination" sufficient to establish
an affirmative action program. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948-55. The Fifth Circuit held
that the district court erred in finding that the general discrimination by public educational
institutions in the State of Texas constituted the "past discrimination" necessary for one
law school to establish an affirmative action program. See id. at 950-51. The court
concluded that even a showing of "past discrimination" by the University of Texas was
inappropriate because the law school operated separately within the system, maintaining
its own admissions program and hiring its own faculty. Id. at 951. For the law school to
establish an affirmative action program in admissions, it had to show that it was designed
to address "past wrongs at that school." Id. at 952. The court looked upon the issue of
past discrimination very narrowly and only considered discrimination by the specific
governmental actor - the University of Texas Law School - to satisfy the compelling
governmental interest requirement. See id.
The Fifth Circuit deemed the evidence presented by the law school relating to its "bad
reputation" in the minority community and its perception as "hostile" to minorities as
insufficient "present effects of past discrimination" to justify the affirmative action
program. Id. The court held this opinion because the "bad reputation" and "hostile"
environment could not be traced to actions of the law school. Id. at 953. In addition, the
law school's actual past discriminatory actions, having ended in the 1960s, were too remote
in time. Id. Because the court found that the admissions policy failed the "compelling
interest" prong of the strict scrutiny test, the court concluded that it did not have to
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Eastern Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit found
unconstitutional the provisions of a Philadelphia ordinance that created a
set-aside for Black subcontractors on city public works contracts."'
Quoting Croson, the court stated that the city could have taken steps to
remedy past discrimination by prime contractors against Black
subcontractors if the city was a "'passive participant' in a system of racial
exclusion."" 9 The Third Circuit stated that, to be a passive participant,
the city had to play a "material role" in private discrimination.120 For
example, the court suggested that the city could remedy discrimination
by a local trade association if the city had been a passive participant in
the private discrimination of that trade association.'
Other circuits have also elaborated on the meaning of passive
participation. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[m]ere infusion of tax
dollars into a discriminatory industry may be sufficient governmental
involvement" to constitute passive participation in privated. • .. 22
discrimination. The Tenth Circuit stated: "Although we do not read
Croson as requiring the municipality to identify an exact linkage between
its award of public contracts and private discrimination, such evidence
would at least enhance the municipality's factual predicate for a race-
and gender-conscious program.',
123
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the FCC can adopt race-
based affirmative action programs to remedy those situations in which
the FCC's actions or policies inhere in the discrimination of others. For
the FCC to establish a race-based affirmative action program, such as
race-based benefits in competitive bidding in the wireless industry, the
114FCC must identify and establish that discrimination exists. The
examine whether it was "narrowly tailored" to advance the government's interest. Id. at
955.
118. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
119. Id. at 599. The court found insufficient evidence of discrimination by prime
contractors against Black subcontractors. Id. at 600-01.
120. See id. at 596.
121. Id. at 601. The court also held that the city did not passively participate in such
discrimination because it did not award contracts through trade association membership.
See id. at 602. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the city's statistical
evidence provided a strong basis of discrimination because it found that the set-aside was
not "narrowly tailored." Id. at 605.
122. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 1991).
123. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1529 (10th Cir.
1994); see also Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming, despite a
First Amendment challenge, the grant of summary judgment by the district court and
finding the police commissioner was entitled to terminate a police officer based on his
bigoted statements to avoid "passive complicity" in such discrimination).
124. See Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, supra note 20, at 995.
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discrimination must be specified; it cannot be merely the identification of
societal discrimination. It can be discrimination by the FCC against
minority licensees. It can also be FCC participation in discrimination by
the private sector, including FCC licensees, suppliers, lenders, brokers,
and customers, against minority-owned telecommunications businesses.
We note that, like most governmental agencies, the FCC failed to
examine its own past conduct to determine whether it discriminated
against minority applicants and licensees.' Instead, it conducted several
exhaustive studies to determine whether the capital markets and the
telecommunications industry discriminated against minority applicants
and licensees.' These studies were designed to determine whether the
FCC was a "passive participant" in the discrimination by others against
minority applicants and licensees."' We believe that the results of the
studies show that FCC has been a "passive participant" in the
discrimination by the capital markets industry.
A connection exists between the FCC's financial requirements and the
discrimination that potential licensees face in receiving loans from
financial institutions. The FCC's "passive participation" in
discrimination is analogous to that of a city in hiring contractors; both
involve the distribution of a limited resource. A city taking bids on
construction offers a limited resource in the form of the tax dollars used
to achieve construction of a project. In such a case, the Croson Court
stated, a city could develop programs to make sure that its tax dollars
were not being used in a discriminatory way."" Similarly, the FCC is
licensing and allocating the limited resource of wireless spectrum
licenses. By awarding licenses via auctions in which the person with the
most money wins, the FCC is distributing its licenses in a manner that
incorporates discrimination by the capital markets against minority-
owned businesses.
1. Capital Market Forces in the Telecommunications Industry
In the study, Whose Spectrum Is It Anyway?, researchers found that
survey respondents, including licensees as well as brokers, lenders, or
other market intermediaries, cited access to capital as "the most common
125. See id.
126. Ivy Planning Group LLC, Federal Communication Commission, Whose Spectrum
Is It Anyway? Historical Study of Market Entry Barriers, Discrimination and Changes in
Broadcast and Wireless Licensing: 1950 to Present 6 (Dec. 2000), at http://www.fcc.gov/
opportunity/mebstudy/historical-study.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2003).
127. Id. at 5.
128. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492 (1989).
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and pervasive barrier to entry.' ' 29 In fact, media broker Brian Cobb
stated that "[o]ur number one criteria . . . is can they pay for it at the
closing and will they pay the most. And that kind of thing supersedes
everything. ''3°
Minority-owned businesses have the dual burden of paying large
amounts of money to acquire wireless licenses at auctions and paying the
costs of building their wireless systems. By having less access to cash,
however, a company is less viable.13' A cash-strapped company is less
able to attract and maintain top personnel, operate up-to-date facilities,
upgrade and maintain state-of-the-art equipment, retain competent
attorneys to represent them before the FCC, promote the business to
customers, or acquire additional licenses. 1 2 Consequently, limited access
to capital severely limits the ability of minority-owned businesses to
acquire wireless licenses.
Capital market discrimination is a major barrier to the development
and success of minority-owned businesses.1 3  The seminal work on
discrimination is The Economics of Discrimination, in which Gary
Becker translated discrimination into economic terms.' 34 Following Dr.
Becker's early work, many other empirical studies have documented
discrimination against minority-owned businesses."' Nearly seventy
percent of small, minority-owned businesses use personal funds to
finance their businesses whereas only one-half of white-owned businesses
have to resort to personal funds. 3 6 In fact, black-owned businesses rely
more heavily upon forms of consumer credit-especially credit cards-
than white-owned businesses do.'37  Ninety-two percent of black
129. See Whose Spectrum Is It Anyway?, supra note 126, at 17.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 17-18.
133. There has been substantial research evidencing discrimination in other contexts.
See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics To Say About Racial
Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 91 (1998); Timothy Bates, Unequal Access: Financial
Institution Lending to Black- and White-Owned Small Business Start- Ups, 19 J. URB. AFF.
487 (1997); William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in
Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 63 (1998); Helen Ladd,
Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 41 (1998); John
Yinger, Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 23 (1998).
134. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 3 (1957).
135. See infra notes 1.39-46 and sources cited therein.
136. RAYMOND SUAREZ & ROBERT CULL, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CAPITAL
FORMATION AND INVESTMENT IN MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES 10 (Apr. 1995).
137. See generally Bates, Unequal Access, supra note 133.
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entrepreneurs reported that they found it difficult to raise capital, and
seventy-five percent of black business owners believe that many black-
owned businesses became so discouraged by unfavorable experiences
that they ceased trying to raise capital.""
The capital available to minority-owned businesses is much less than
that available to majority-owned businesses. Businesses owned by white
males were "four times more likely than [minority-owned businesses] to
secure $1,000,000 or more to start or acquire a business;" "three to six
times more likely to secure $100,000 to $1,000,000 and two to three times
more likely to secure $50,000 to $100,000;" and "twice as likely to receive
equity capital from partners and investors." 9  Minority-owned
businesses usually pursued commercial bank loans, when available.
Seventy-three percent of black-owned businesses polled obtained their
capital from banks.'4° After controlling for credit-worthiness, a study by
Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken showed that the denial rate for
credit of black-owned firms was twice that of white firms.41  They also
found that black-owned firms pay higher interest rates than non-
142minority-owned firms after controlling for firm characteristics. In a
later study by Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, after controlling for firm
characteristics, they found that black and Hispanic firms had statistically
significant higher probabilities of loan rejection than non-minority
firms.14 ' Banks provided white borrowers with $1.83 in debt capital for
each dollar of equity they invested in their business; in contrast, black
borrowers received only $1.16 for each dollar of equity capital.
144
Professor Bates concluded that "banks treat white and black loan
recipients differently even when their qualifications do not differ.' ' 45 In a
138. See Eugene Carlson, Turned Down, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1993, at R1.
139. SUAREZ & CULL, supra note 136, at 11 (noting that some of these disparities are
attributable to the "lack of wealth creation and intergenerational wealth accumulation by
minority communities"). Other data show that Black households had a median net worth
of $3,397, versus $39,135 for white households. TIMOTHY BATES, BANKING ON BLACK
ENTERPRISE 44-45 (1993). Professor Bates maintained that "[l]acking assets,... [B]lack
entrepreneurs remain ill-equipped to cope with economic adversities and to exploit
economic opportunities." Id. at 45.
140. Carlson, supra note 138, at R1.
141. Access to Credit for Minority Owned Businesses: Competition, Small Business
Financing and Discrimination: Evidence for a New Survey (1999), available at http://
www.chicagofed.org/cedric/publications/BusAcc/II. %20Access%20to%20Credit.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Id. However, because of small sample size, they were not able to unequivocally
show that prejudice caused this disparity.
144. BATES, BANKING ON BLACK ENTERPRISE, supra note 139, at 50.
145 id.
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study commissioned by the U.S. Small Business Administration, even
when controlling for credit history, Faith Ando found that black
borrowers were less likely to receive loan approval.
4
6
The average financing received by newly formed small businesses
ranged from $32,178 for businesses owned by white males to $15,908 for
black-owned businesses. 47  In a survey of minority-owned
telecommunications businesses, all of the owners reported that they
required capital in excess of these averages.48  Some minority-owned
entrepreneurs who have the potential to start new businesses never do
because they are unable to obtain the financial capital necessary to
launch their planned ventures. These entrepreneurs are known as
"discouraged entrepreneurs," and this phenomenon is most pronounced
in capital intensive lines of small businesses. 50
Dr. William D. Bradford conducted a capital market study on behalf of
the FCC.151 In the study, Bradford found that forty-three percent of
auction participants responded affirmatively to a survey question asking
whether they had applied for debt financing.52  Many
telecommunications and other technology-based ventures require
substantial start-up investment. Limitations on capital constrain
minority-owned businesses and their participation in the capital-intensive
telecommunications businesses. '5 Bradford found that the loan
applications of minority-owned wireless firms were less likely to be
accepted than those applications of non-minority firms.54 These same
146. SUAREZ & CULL, supra note 136, at 15 (citing FAITH ANDO, AN ANALYSIS OF
ACCESS TO BANK CREDIT (1988)).
147. Id. at 17.
148. Id. (citing a telephone survey conducted by Quality Management International,
May 22-June 2,1994).
149. Bates, Unequal Access, supra note 133, at 488.
150. Id. (citing Z. Acs & D. Audretsch, Small Firm Entry in Manufacturing, 56
ECONOMICA 255-265 (1989)).
151. WILLIAM D. BRADFORD, DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL MARKETS,
BROADCAST/WIRELESS SPECTRUM SERVICE PROVIDERS AND AUCTION OUTCOMES
(Dec. 5, 2000), at http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb-study/capital-market-study.pdf
(last visited Jan. 12, 2003). Dr. Bradford is the "Endowed Professor of Business and
Economic Development and a Professor of Finance at the School of Business, University
of Washington." Id. at iii. The data was collected from the FCC Auction Application
Survey. Id. at vi. In that survey, auction applicants were questioned about their latest
license applications or attempted acquisitions; this information was supplemented by
information available on the FCC website. Id.
152. Id. at 11-12 (noting that this response may be low because it may overlook firms
that inquired but did not apply because they were discouraged).
153. See id. at v.
154. Id. at vii.
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minority borrowers also paid higher interest rates than non-minority
firms.'55
Dr. Bradford's study is buttressed by other studies. For instance, the
National Telecommunications Information Administration Report found
that minorities who acquired capital for telecommunication properties
were better educated than their white counterparts.'56 This disparity
might be indicative of discrimination.
The FCC's anecdotal study, entitled Whose Spectrum Is It Anyway?,
also buttressed Dr. Bradford's study. This study reported that brokers
and large lenders indicated that they worked with very few minority
telecommunications applicants or buyers.' Media broker, Brian Cobb,
observed that minority applicants are more likely to be stereotyped."'
He stated that a seller will ask more questions of a minority buyer and
want more documentation of financial capability.' After stating that he
had not observed racial discrimination, Cobb ironically said, "I don't
think it's a matter of prejudice-it's not overt prejudice. It's a matter
of-it's a perception that [minorities and women] may not have as much
money to close, so they ask more questions."'' Jim Winston, Executive
Director of the National Association of Black-Owned Broadcasters,
stated that minorities often had more stringent loan terms than their
white counterparts."' Winston explained:
There was always the ongoing problem being a minority buyer,
the terms were always stiffer. If you could get a lending
institution to talk to you, the terms they came up with were
always stiffer, so that minority buyers often found themselves
having to sign a personal guarantee to the bank when they
borrowed money against the station. So, essentially, they would
take a security interest in all the assets of the station and would
still come to the borrower and say [that they wanted] a personal
guarantee from you on top of that. There always seemed to be
the stories of guys who were buying their second or third or
fourth stations, who were still being required to do personal
guarantees. And, nobody was seeing anybody else's bank loan
155. Id.
156. See SUAREZ & CULL, supra note 136, at 30.




161. Id. at 25.
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documents. But there was this view that the restrictions were-
that personal guarantees stayed with our guys longer.
16 2
When required to pledge personal assets to secure loans, minority-
owned businesses are often confronted with additional market barriers as
a result of historic disparities of intergenerational wealth between people
of color and their demographic counterparts. 16  S. Jenell Trigg, a
communications lawyer, stated that minorities "have less collateral and
less personal equity before they entered into business" than other
demographic groups."' She continued, "[T]hey're always starting off at a
deficit when it comes to cash. And the longer it takes to acquire
property, the more legal fees .... If you give up, you've got nothing to
show for it .... You're pouring... bad money into good.'
65
The Whose Spectrum Is It Anyway? survey respondents also cited a
higher cost of capital for minority-owned telecommunications businesses
than for others. Anthony Chase, an African-American radio and
wireless licensee, said that the higher cost of capital for small business
"comes with the territory, and you just have to learn to work with it."'' 66
Chase explained:
[M]y sense is that the [cost of capital] is always very high for
start up businesses and it's certainly no exception in my case.
It's very high. It's a real barrier to entry in the business. And
you know, you just [have to] suffer through it and hope that
your first deal doesn't necessarily become your last because you
have to pay pawnshop rates to get into the business.
More explicitly, Charles Cherry, an African-American licensee, thinks
that "race probably adds an additional risk factor, but [he] can't say
that's the sole sort of determinative in these kinds of deals .... [His] gut
tells [him] that he's paying a high price [because he is a minority].' 68
In contrast, a number of small non-minority licensees surveyed
reported a relatively easy time in raising capital. For instance, white
licensee, Trent Boaldin, reported that his bankers were helpful in
suggesting to him how to improve his likelihood of getting a loan. 69 He
stated:
162. Id.
163. Id. at 27.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 36.
167. ld.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 35.
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We approached three lenders .... They had some suggestions
for changes to make to the assumptions and improvements to
make in the plan. So we incorporated the various suggestions
from each one that we talked to, revised the plan, and sent it
back .... [A]nd then at that point we got the indication from
one of them that [he was] willing to go .... We're pleased with
what we've got.1
70
Whose Spectrum Is It Anyway? concluded that, while small broadcasting
and wireless telecommunications businesses have struggled to find
affordable and sufficient capital, discriminatory practices in the banking
industry have disadvantaged minority-owned businesses more so than
their demographic counterparts. "
Related to the discrimination is the fact that lenders and venture
capitalists are generally only interested in funding deals that exceed $10
million or are in more than one market.1 72 Exceptions are sometimes
made for stations in top ten markets.'73 In addition, the loan applicant
needs to have "credibility" with the banker.7 4 Media broker, Brian
Cobbs, reported that not having "credibility" is "a big handicap for
somebody starting out that doesn't have a lot of money or maybe has
certain talents but doesn't have the sophistication in the financial area to
put that package together.''7 The importance of having such
"credibility" is illustrated by reports of experienced minorities who were
not treated seriously by bankers.7 1 Peter W. Fong, an Asian-American
wireless applicant, recalled:
It just seemed like we don't have any track record, and it is very
difficult for people to take us credibly. You have to start
somewhere, and we are not coming off from some Chinese
restaurant, you know, jumping into telecommunications. I
myself have [fifteen] years working with the telephone
company, and my partner had [twenty-five] years, and so we
know what we are doing, but still it ... is just very difficult for
people to take us seriously.
7 7
170. Id.
171. Id. at 27.
172. Id. at 39.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 44.
175. Id. at 45.
176. Id. at 44-45.
177. ld. at 45.
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2. The FCC Passively Contributes to Capital Market Discrimination
Against Minority-Owned Businesses
The competitive bidding process authorized by Congress incorporates
the barriers to entry faced by minority-owned businesses in the capital
markets. 118 By auctioning public spectrum to the highest bidder,"7 9 the
FCC acts as a passive participant in the discrimination of the capital
markets against minority-owned businesses. Competitive bidding for
licensing means that the person who has access to the most capital has
the best opportunity to win a license.8"" If most minority-owned
businesses are less likely to obtain financing due to discrimination in the
capital markets, then minority-owned businesses are at a severe
disadvantage in getting licenses.' 8' Bradford concludes that "[w]hen
there is capital market discrimination, minorities will be capital
constrained and less likely to qualify for any auction and less likely to win
auctions. '82 At the Policy Forum on Market Entry Barriers Faced by
Small Minority and Women-Owned Businesses in the Communications
Industry, Janet Smith, the president of the group that completed the
Whose Spectrum Is It Anyway? study, testified that "[clapital is king" and
that the key difference between the success of minority-owned businesses
and their demographic counterparts was "access to capital. ' 83
Capital market discrimination results in a smaller pool of minority
applicants. The FCC deposit requirements, which are up-front payments
prior to competitive bidding, further diminish the opportunities for
minority-owned businesses. For example, only 48.3 percent of minority
applicants in the FCC competitive bidding became qualified bidders
whereas 67.5 percent of the white-owned firms became qualified
bidders1 s Capital market discrimination also affects the potential
maximum bid of minority applicants. For every dollar that whites
receive from capital markets, members of minority groups receive
178. See id. at 108.
179. See generally id. at 108-12.
180. See id. at 108 (noting that "successful applicants, as a result of the auction bidding
process, are required to pay tens and often hundreds of thousands of dollars to the FCC
for each license awarded to them").
181. Id.
182. BRADFORD, supra note 151, at 27.
183. In re Policy Forum on Market Entry Barriers Faced by Small Minority and
Women-Owned Businesses in the Communications Industry (Dec. 12, 2000), at 75
(testimony of Janet Smith).
184. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, FCC ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL
DISCRIMINATION UTILIZATION RATIOS FOR MINORITY- AND WOMEN-OWNED
COMPANIES 12 (1999).
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considerably less. The result is that qualified minority bidders are less
likely to secure spectrum through bidding or to secure as much spectrum
as white-owned businesses.
The FCC's passive participation in the capital market discrimination
against minority-owned businesses is not the sole issue to be considered
in determining whether a remedial affirmative action program is
permissible. The Croson Court stated that another factor to be
considered is the utilization of minority-owned businesses."" We look at
this issue in the next Section.
B. The Underutilization of Minority Licensees
Studies used to prove the existence of remediable discrimination must
demonstrate "gross statistical disparities between the proportion [of
those licensed] ... and the proportion of [those] willing and able to [be
licensed]."' 86 In Croson, the Supreme Court was concerned that the
statistical evidence used to establish discrimination was faulty because it
compared the number of minority-owned firms awarded contracts to the
percentage of minorities in Richmond's population.' The Croson Court
held that constitutionally permissible statistical evidence of
discrimination would compare those minority-owned firms utilized by
the City of Richmond to those available in the City of Richmond to
perform that type of work. 188 The Croson Court derived the adverse
impact rules from the Department of Labor guidelines for showing
adverse impact. 89
It may be that measuring the probability that a minority-owned firm
will win a license at auction is a more accurate indicator of discrimination
185. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492 (1989).
186. Engineering Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d
895, 907 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Anecdotal evidence may be
used to help establish discrimination; it is especially helpful to buttress the statistical
evidence. Id. However, anecdotal evidence alone does not prove discriminatory practices.
187. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
188. Id. at 501-02.
189. Information on Impact, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2002); see also Engineering
Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 914 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D as analogous authority on
disparity indices indicative of discrimination). Section 1607.4D prescribes an eighty
percent rule. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (2002). Assume that one hundred qualified and
available minority-owned and one hundred qualified and available majority-owned firms
exist in a particular city over the course of a year. If all one hundred of the majority-
owned firms win contracts, but only seventy of the qualified minority-owned firms do so,
then there is evidence of adverse impact. Seventy minority-owned firms as compared to
one hundred majority-owned firms is less than eighty percent, which indicates
underutilization.
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than the ratio of utilized minority-owned firms to those available to do
the work.' 90 Dr. Bradford performed such a calculation in Discrimination
in Capital Markets, Broadcast/Wireless Spectrum Service Providers and
Auction Outcomes and determined that the probability of a minority-
owned business winning a license in the firm's most recent auction is
lower than the probability of a non-minority owned firm."' The results
were statistically significant.
However, the Croson Court required the utilization ratio analysis to
evaluate the constitutionality of remedial affirmative action programs.' 9'
This utilization analysis is complex in its application to the
telecommunications industry for two reasons. First, in the
telecommunications industry, the numerator of the utilization ratio, the
number of firms obtaining licenses, is likely to be constant and fixed, with
fewer opportunities over time than in the contracting industry. This
result occurs because the FCC awards a finite number of licenses and the
license term is for several years. Thus, few opportunities exist for the
FCC to award other licenses to recipients. In contrast, in the contracting
context, the numerator of the utilization ratio, which is the number of
firms actually receiving a contract, is larger and more dynamic than in the
telecommunications licensing context. Many more contracts occur
because many more opportunities are present for contractors to receive
awards, and the awards are likely to be recurring. In the contracting
context, the government offers many contracts and subcontracts in which
a small business may win awards for doing several parts of several
different jobs. For instance, a small business could win different awards
to do masonry, carpentry, and painting on several different jobs across a
city over the course of one year whereas a small telecommunications
company has fewer opportunities to win a license in that year.
Second, in the telecommunications industry, the denominator of the
utilization ratio, the number of firms qualified and available to win a
license, is not easy to discern because there is no requirement, except
money or access to capital for someone bidding on a wireless license.
The pool of potential applicants could include individuals with no
previous connection with the telecommunications industry. Funeral
parlor owners, nightclub owners, CPAs, attorneys, physicians, as well as
telecommunications industry executives could all try to acquire a license.
190. Bradford found that the probability of a minority-owned firm winning a license at
auction was consistently less than the probability of a majority-owned firm doing so.
BRADFORD, supra note 151, at viii.
191. Id.
192. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02.
[Vol. 52:351
Disparity in the Auction of Wireless Telecommunications
The FCC has no rules preventing individuals from other industries from
acquiring wireless licenses. In contrast, in the contracting industry, it is
somewhat easier to identify those individuals who are available and
qualified to do the work. These contractors often have to submit their
qualifications to do a job. They often have to meet certain technical or
experiential requirements before participating. Given these
considerations, we believe that the foregoing analysis is very conservative
because the denominator chosen includes only those individuals who
actually applied for a license.
1. Average Wireless Utilization Ratio Calculations
The FCC engaged the services of the accounting firm, Ernst & Young,
to conduct a study on utilization ratios for the wireless auction. 93 Ernst
& Young calculated several different utilization ratios: (1) the General
Utilization Ratio that indicates the percentage of winners, those who
won at least one license, among all auction applicants;94 (2) the
Qualifying Ratio that calculates the percentage of applicants who qualify
to bid among all auction applicants;'95 (3) the Success Ratio that indicates
the percentage of auction winners, those who won at least one license,
among all qualified auction applicants;'96 and (4) the Economic Value
Ratio that calculates minority-owned businesses' share of the total
economic value of the licenses secured as compared to the total
economic value of licenses auctioned.
97
a. The General Utilization Ratio
The General Utilization Ratio presents "an overall view of the auction
outcomes, based on the number of applicants and winners" for each part
of the wireless spectrum that has been part of the competitive bidding
process.198 It calculates the ratio of the number of businesses receiving
wireless spectrum licenses to the available pool of businesses applying for
193. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DISCRIMINATION UTILIZATION RATIOS FOR
MINORITY- AND WOMEN-OWNED COMPANIES IN FCC WIRELESS SPECTRUM AUCTION
(Dec. 5, 2000), at http://www.fcc.gov/meb-study/auction utilization-study.pdf (last visited
Jan. 12, 2003).
194. Id. at 2. Throughout the study, Ernst & Young defined an "auction applicant" as
"a company (or an individual) who submitted Form 175 ("Short Form") indicating an
interest to participate in an auction." Id. at 2 n.1.
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spectrum licenses and compares them demographically.199 By calculating
a utilization ratio in this fashion, the available pool of minority-owned
entities is limited to those actually seeking spectrum in the particular
auction. It is a very conservative measure of utilization; it does not
include all those minority-owned businesses that would have submitted a
bid but for discrimination that precluded them from being aware of the
process. We believe that actually considering only those minority-owned
businesses that submitted applications is a more defendable measure of•• 200
utilization. Ernst & Young found that "[w]hen participation and
success are measured by counting the percentages of winners from all
auction participants (general utilization ratio), minority and women
applicants appear to be somewhat less likely to win at least one license
relative to other applicants. These results were statistically significant. "2 01
The general utilization ratios for all auctions showed that 37.40 percent
of non-minority and 31.97 percent of minority applicants win licenses.02
These differences were statistically significant, showing on average that
minority-owned businesses won licenses at lower rates than other firms.03
When auction applicants were grouped by size, Ernst & Young failed
to find a statistical discrepancy between small minority and small non-o. 204
minority firms. When large companies were compared, however,
199. Id. at 2, 9-11.
200. We note that the Croson Court criticized the City of Richmond's affirmative
action plan as being overly broad because it encompassed all racial and ethnic minorities -
even those that were not a significant percentage of the City of Richmond's population or
those that faced historic discrimination in that city. One could argue that these utilization
numbers should be broken down into each racial and ethnic subgroup, i.e., African
Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders.
However, we are of the opinion that Croson is distinguishable and inapplicable because
Croson dealt with a city's affirmative action plan, which might have regional demographic
anomalies. The FCC is a national agency that distributes licenses across the United States.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to make demographic differences between racial and ethnic
minority groups.
201. Id. at 4. The differences between probabilities was found to be statistically
significant. Id. Ernst & Young noted that statistical significance tests are used to
determine whether the difference between the two ratios indicates a systematic pattern.
Id. at 10.
202. Id. at 10.
203. Id. Ernst & Young noted that the number of applicants for individual auctions, in
which the percentage of minority-owned businesses win is sometimes larger and
sometimes smaller than that of their demographic counterparts, were inconclusive. Id. at
10-11. These small numbers of applicants made some of the individual auction
calculations because the number of minority applicants and winners were too small to use
statistical tests. Id. at 11. In those cases in which sufficient numbers of minority owners
were present, none of the differences was statistically significant for any individual
auction. Id. at 10.
204. Id. at 11.
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minority-owned businesses had a statistically significant lower general
205
utilization ratio than their demographic counterparts.
The lack of statistical difference among small businesses might also be
related to the difference in auctions with installment payments. Ernst &
Young found that minority-owned businesses are just as likely to win
licenses in auctions with installment plans, whereas, in the absence of
such plans, minority-owned businesses are less likely to win licenses than
their demographic counterparts.2 6  Since the FCC installment plan
program was employed to benefit small businesses, it is no surprise that
this program would also benefit many minority businesses, which are
predominately small.
b. The Qualifying Ratio
Applicants must submit Form 175 and make an upfront payment to
qualify to bid in an auction with the upfront payment determining
bidding eligibility.27 Each license to be auctioned has a certain number
of bidding units. 20' An applicant provides an upfront payment for a
certain number of bidding units, to be used singly or in combination,
until his or her bidding units are exhausted.2 9
The qualifying ratio indicates the percentage of minority-owned
businesses that qualify to bid."0 Ernst & Young found a significant
difference in average qualifying ratios for minority-owned businesses and
their demographic counterparts. 21   The average qualifying ratio for
minority applicants was 48.3 percent, much less than 67.5 percent for
non-minority applicants.2 This difference indicated a systematic
disparity in qualifying rates."' In addition, minorities qualified at
214
significantly lower rates even in auctions that used installment plans.
Ernst & Young speculated that differential access to capital would
explain the lower qualifying ratio for minority-owned businesses.2"5
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ability to make the necessary upfront payments. 216  Ernst & Young
explained the difference in the general utilization between minority
applicants and their demographic counterparts on the difference in rates
at which minority-owned businesses qualified to bid relative to other
applicants.2 7
c. The Success Ratio
The success ratio is defined as "a measure of qualified applicants who
win bids., 218 It is calculated as the percentage of winners out of all
qualified applicants.2 9 Ernst & Young found that qualifying minority
applicants, in fact, won licenses at higher rates than their demographic
counterparts. 220 Across all auctions, 66.1 percent of qualified minorities
221won licenses as compared to 55.4 percent of others. When installment
plans were considered, qualifying minority applicants were more likely
than their counterparts to win in auctions and, in auctions without
installment plans, qualifying minority applicants were less likely to win
than their demographic counterparts. 2  These differences were
statistically significant.223
The difference in outcomes between auctions with and without
installment plans suggests that even qualifying minorities confront capital
obstacles that impede their success in the absence of some sort of
support. In grouping the demographic groups by size, no difference
existed in the success ratios between large qualifying minority-owned
businesses and their large demographic counterparts, but small qualifying
minorities won licenses more than others.224
Ernst & Young concluded that, although minority applicants tended to
qualify less frequently than other applicants, those that did qualify
succeeded in receiving a license at rates comparable to all demographic
groups.2" Therefore, the biggest barrier for minorities was in qualifying
to bid. Qualifying to bid is directly related to having sufficient capital.
226
Likewise, the results of the FCC auction regime are tied to access to
216. Id.
217. See id.







225. Id. at 14.
226. See id. at 11.
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capital. Because most minority-owned businesses face capital market
discrimination, they have less access to capital than their demographic
counterparts. Therefore, the FCC auction regime has a deleterious and
discriminatory effect on minority-owned applicants and licensees.
d. The Economic Value Per Winner Ratio
Ernst & Young pointed out that most of the auction revenues came
27from non-minority companies. Examining the revenues also
highlighted the disparity in economic value received by minority-owned
winners as compared to others.228 This disparity was partially attributable
to the fact that the number of minority auction winners was smaller than
the number of other winners. 21' The average value per winner was $22.5
million for minority applicants and $32 million for non-minority
applicants. Large, minority-owned companies contributed less auction
revenues on average for their licenses than their demographic
counterparts. 231 In contrast, for small minority-owned companies, the
average value per winner was larger than that for non-minority
232counterparts. Ernst & Young concluded that there was no systematic
233
difference in averages between minority-owned and other companies.
e. Comparison of the Ratios
The General Utilization Ratio better reflects the actual number of
minority firms available than the Success Ratio. The FCC's standards in
determining qualification relates to an applicant's ability to provide a
ten-percent down payment within a certain prescribed time of the bid.
Minority-owned businesses are more likely to rely on borrowed funds to
make a down payment than non-minority-owned businesses. Therefore,
227. Id. at 15.
228. See id. at 15, 30.
229. Id. at 15.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 16.
232. Id.
233. Id. Ernst & Young also calculated a return-on-payment ratio, which scaled the
economic value of the licenses won with the upfront payments paid. Id. Because upfront
payments determine the number of licenses on which the applicant may bid, Ernst &
Young expected that the applicants who could make larger upfront payments would be
able to win more valuable and numerous licenses. Id. However, Ernst & Young
concluded that, as compared to their demographic counterparts, minority businesses
generated relatively more value for licenses won relative to upfront payments made. Id.
Ernst & Young pointed out that upfront payments may be an "imperfect indicator" of
minority firms' interest in licenses. Id. at 17. In addition, upfront payment data were
unavailable for many of the nineteen auctions in the study. Id. at 16.
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if we were to use the pool of qualified bidders as the measure of
availability as was done in the Success Ratio, the utilization ratio itself
would incorporate capital market discrimination.
Nonetheless, the comparison among the General Utilization Ratio,
Qualifying Ratio, and Success Ratio shows that minority-owned
businesses are generally underutilized in terms of auction outcomes. In
addition, these ratios show that once the minority-owned business
qualifies and obtains sufficient capital, it can perform almost as well at
auctions as other businesses in the auction process. Each of these
measures shows that the presence of installment payments may mitigate
the effect of capital constraints on minority-owned businesses.
At an FCC policy forum, Dr. Bradford concluded that "installment
plans is [sic] one form of financing ... that, because of capital market
restrictions, offsets the negative that would otherwise be experienced by
women and minorities." '234 However, at the same forum, James Winston,
Chair of the National Association of Black-Owned Broadcasters,
criticized the FCC's use of installment payments. 35 Winston stated that,
although the presence of installment payments may have increased the
success rates of minority-owned applicants in obtaining licenses, many
installment payment winners lost their licenses, lost their previously paid
installment payments, and lost their upfront payments, or were forced
into bankruptcy.236 Winston was of the opinion that the "actual history of
the installment payment" would show that "installment payments were
the kiss of death.,
237
Clearly, Winston is right: the way the installment payment program
worked, in his examples, seemed to disadvantage minority wireless
applicants. Bradford's study does not necessarily suggest that the FCC
re-establish its installment payment program. However, Bradford's
findings, with Ernst & Young's, are very significant because they
demonstrate that some sort of financing, like installment payments,
greatly increases the number of successful outcomes for minority-owned
businesses. This increase in successful outcomes clearly demonstrates
234. In re Policy Forum on Market Entry Barriers Faced by Small, Minority and
Women-Owned Businesses in the Communications Industry (Dec. 12, 2000), at 44-46
(testimony of Dr. William Bradford) (noting that bidding credits also had a similar effect
on the outcomes for minority-owned businesses).
235. Id. at 91-92.
236. Id. at 91 (noting that one of the few minority-owned companies that constructed a
C-block license sold the system soon after it was constructed).
237. Id. at 92. Winston attributed the problem to the fact that installment plans made
the FCC a "senior lender" and, as such, was able to revoke the license for nonpayment.
Id.
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that lack of success for these businesses is attributable to capital
constraints.
The differences in the utilization measures also demonstrate the
complexities of utilization ratios and the difficult question to be
answered by federal and state governments pursuing an affirmative
action program. These calculations, prescribed by the Croson Court,
indicate the existence of remediable discrimination necessitating some
sort of affirmative action relief.238
Each of these calculations of average underutilization are also
significant because during some of these time periods the FCC had either
race-neutral or race-conscious programs designed to increase
participation by minority-owned or small businesses. After the race-
conscious programs came into question post-Adarand, the race-based
programs were eliminated and replaced by race-neutral programs/ • 239
designed to help small businesses. Despite these programs, significant
underutilization of minority-owned businesses existed in the FCC
competitive bidding process.
2. Analysis of Individual Auctions by Programs
We have also analyzed some of the interesting Ernst & Young data
across the individual auction of spectrum. For instance, one hundred
percent of financially qualified minority-owned businesses won licenses
in the DEF Block auction.2'4 The DEF Block auctioned spectrum for
mobile voice and data. ' However, when those businesses that failed to
qualify were considered, only 59.26 percent of minority applicants won
242these licenses. This percentage was the highest general minority
participation rate for any of the individual spectrum calculations . 243 Even
though there appears to be a high utilization of qualified minority-owned
businesses in the DEF auction, they received a much lower percentage of
the monetary value in that auction, with only 3.17 percent of the net
238. The types of programs that may increase the utilization of minority-owned
businesses include bidding credits for minority-owned businesses and installment
payments. However, the discussion of possible affirmative action programs is beyond the
discussion of this Article.
239. FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, at B1, available at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/fc970353.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2003).
240. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 193, at 24 (Table 9).
241. Id. at 9.
242. See id. at 18 (Table 1).
243. See id.
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revenue.14   The one hundred percent success by qualified minority-
owned businesses in this auction is particularly significant because the
DEF Block used installment payments and bidding credits for small
businesses generally, not particularly for minority businesses. The high
utilization ratio is probably attributable to the financing options that the
FCC provided for this auction, which gave the minority-owned
businesses an incentive to participate and allowed them to overcome the
capital constraints imposed by capital market discrimination.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Nationwide Narrowband
2 45
auction had bidding credits for minorities but did not have financial
incentives, such as installment payments or bidding credits for small
businesses.141 In this auction, no minority-owned businesses won a
license in an auction, even though all six qualified.14' Because this
auction did not provide any financing arrangements, this low utilization
ratio underscores the capital market discrimination that these groups
face.
In the auctions where no bidding credits and no financing
arrangements were provided to minority-owned businesses, no minority-
owned businesses won a license. 48 In conclusion, underutilization of
minority-owned businesses significantly decreased as the FCC used
programs such as installment payments, low down payments, and bidding
credits to address capital market discrimination against minority-owned
businesses.
V. CONCLUSION
In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that all government affirmative
action programs would be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test. Strict
scrutiny requires that these remedial programs satisfy a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored. The FCC has
implemented several programs to increase ownership of broadcast and
other spectrum by members of minority groups. In overruling the
standard of review used in Metro Broadcasting, the Adarand Court raised
the question of whether any FCC affirmative action programs can meet
the stiff standard of Adarand.
244. Id. at 27 (Table 13).
245. Narrowband was also a form of advanced paging and data.
246. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 193, at 18 (Table 1); see also FCC Auction Small
Business Incentives, Auction Design Summary (on file with author).
247. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 193, at 18 (Table 1); id. at 21 (Table 5).
248. Such was the case for auctions 4, 8, 9, 12, and 15. See id. at 18 (Table 1). These
auctions were for multi-channel video and mobile voice and data services. Id. at 9.
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In this Article, we analyzed these post-Adarand standards, and we
argued that there is a compelling governmental interest for the FCC to
adopt affirmative action programs for wireless auctions because the FCC
has been a passive participant in the discrimination of the capital
markets. Studies show that minority-owned businesses are less likely to
receive bank loans than majority-owned businesses, after controlling for
bad credit. This discrimination makes it much harder for minority-
owned businesses to participate in the competitive bidding process with
non-minority-owned firms. The budget constraints caused by capital
market discrimination make it difficult for minority-owned businesses to
win bids and to be deemed financially qualified to bid.
We also analyzed the FCC-commissioned studies that show that
minority wireless auction participants have a lower probability of
securing a license than their demographic counterparts. In addition, we
employed the Croson-required utilization ratio analysis to show that
capital market discrimination has led to the significant underutilization of
minority-owned businesses in the wireless competitive bidding process.
Therefore, a compelling governmental interest exists for the FCC to
establish a remedial program for distributing wireless licenses.
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